March 1987
Definition of “language”: A language is the public patterned expressions of an individual which have been established and normed in and relative to a physical and social context. Thus:
Thinking is not a language, though it may use language.
Physical motions may be a language, if patterned and socially normed.
Parrot talk may use a language, but only in the same sense that a tape-recorder does.
To be “established and normed” in a physical context means that the definitions are shared in some community.
Postulates of this system of thinking about language:
1. All meaning is personal. (Symbols or actions do not mean anything. Only people mean things through symbols or actions.)
Thus symbols have modal usages but no literal meaning.
2. All meaning is total. (To elicit a total understanding of what any person means by a given symbolic usage, the entire contents of his mind would need to be understood.)
3. No symbol usage should be considered to be self-referential. (To avoid Russell’s paradox.)
4. All meaning is abstract. (Neither a part nor the total of phenomenal particularity is ever “meant” by a person. We think only in terms of universals. All so-called “particulars” of thought are actually a kind of universal, including proper names.)
5. There are two basic kinds of languages:
- a. In vernacular languages, words represent concept universals which have only a “family resemblance” meaning pattern in common.
- b. In technical languages, words represent concepts which have a common essence. (Thus only technical languages can successfully and fully use logic, for there the problem of excluded middle is taken care of.)
6. The general purpose of language is to assist the individual mind to become adequate to reality, to inform the mind so that the person can act more intelligently.
The unit of language is the assertion. An assertion is a patterned action by which an individual expresses itself agentively. Every assertion may be (must be) analyzed into four parts to be understood by a given observer:
- A speaker intention must be hypothesized.
- The patterned expression must be identified. (The actual words.)
- A meaning pattern must be hypothesized. (Hearer supposes what the speaker intends his words to mean.)
- A relevance or truth-function must be hypothesized.
This four-part meaning pattern is seen in watching an archer. To understand the archer one must put four pieces of information together:
- one must decide what the intent of the archer is, to aim at a target, as in target practice, or to aim at people. Is he friend or foe?
- one must have some sense of what the archer is shooting. Is he shooting wavering reeds or steel-tipped war arrows?
- one must note at what the archer is aiming. If he is aiming at me, I need to get the message, the meaning.
- I must have some sense of what will result if his arrow strikes me: serious wound and death?
Meaning is always the relating of universals (patterns). To say “this arrow is poison-tipped” is to overlay the target pattern (this arrow) with another pattern (poison-tipped) in an affirmative relationship. The logic of meaning is simple: it is simply either the overlay of a secondary pattern on target pattern (affirmation); or it is the blocking of overlay of secondary pattern on target pattern (denial: negation or subtraction).
In a modified Zemb frame this would mean that thema is the target pattern or universal, rhema is the secondary or overlay pattern, and the phema is the signaling of addition or non-addition of patterns (which includes both subtraction and simple blocking of addition).
Meaning does not exhaust the assertion, however. Meaning establishes only the possibility for concept formation which the speaker wishes to emphasize. How that asserted concept formation is to be related to the universe must next be described.
There are three kinds of assertions:
- Disclosures: Revelation of personal thoughts and feelings by a speaker.
- Directives: Attempts by a speaker to produce specific actions in a hearer.
- Descriptions: Attempts by a speaker to enable the hearer to conceptualize a reality external to both the speaker and the hearer (either in the absence or the presence of the thing being talked about).
When a hearer attempts to understand a speaker, in addition to forming a meaning for the symbols used, the hearer must decide whether the speaker is using language in the disclosure mode, the directive mode or the descriptive mode. If the hearer selects the disclosure mode, he cannot look for a referent, but will look to see if the actions of the speaker are consistent with his professed disclosure. If the hearer selects the directive mode, he will act or not act, as he thinks appropriate, and then watch to see what the subsequent reaction of the speaker will be. If the hearer selects the description mode, then the hearer will look to the universe, to the referent if possible, to see if the speaker spoke truthfully.
In all interpretation, the hearer must judge the relevance of the speaker’s assertion to something in the context which the speaker and hearer have in common, which must include relevance in space and time. This establishment of the relevance of the meaning of the assertion is a fourth element. In terms of Zemb’s analysis, I would call this the schema, the hearer’s perception as to how the assertion relates to the universe.
The crux of the matter is the addition of schema to the thema-phema-rhema may remain constant while the schema varies. It may mean a disclosure of anger and impatience: I have told you a thousand times where the book is. It may be a directive: Don’t ask me; look it up for yourself in the book on the table. Or it may be description: The book is not in its normal place because I just put it on the table.
Thus there is a minimum of four things which must be established to complete an assertion: target class (thema), overlay class (rhema), addition or non-addition of the overlay class (phema), and the time, place and respect in which the thema-phema-rhema is to apply to the universe (schema).
I agree with Zemb that the logic of assertions is separate from the syntax of the language. Syntax is patterned expression which varies from culture to culture. Assertions are independent of cultural expression as relationships among speaker-hearer-universe.